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ISSUE BRIEF 
A Research and Educational Affiliate of TransAfrica SEPTEMBER 1983 
THE CIVIL WAR IN CHAD 
For a brief moment this summer, world attention was focused on Chad. The country, which gained independence from France on 
August 11, 1960, is a vast, landlocked nation in the northeastern corner of West Africa. It is huge, but sparsely populated with a land 
mass which is more than twice the size of France and with a population of only 4.9 million, which is forty-five percent Muslim, forty-five 
percent indigenous, and fifteen percent Christian. Eighty-five percent of the population is illiterate. Only seventeen percent of the land 
is arable. Although mineral wealth (uranium, gold, and other minerals) may be present, no means exists to exploit it. The country has 
one of the least developed industrial bases in Africa, and there are no railways and virtually no roads. With a GNP of $109 per capita, 
Chad is perhaps the poorest nation on the world's poorest continent. 
Why, then, all the attention? More specifically, why was the Reagan administration so concerned? The June-August fighting in Chad 
was merely the latest battle in Africa's longest-running civil war. For eighteen years, as many as eleven factions have fought for control 
of the impoverished nation. Each faction has its foreign supporters, arms suppliers, and financiers who have helped prolong the war. 
Chief among these "outside agitators" are Libya historically and the United States currently. Despite the absence of a discernable ideological 
difference between the principal combatants, Hissene Habre and Goukouni Woddeye, the Reagan administration views Chad's civil war 
in the East-West context. Because of Libyan involvement, they see the war as a fight between pro-Libyan and anti-Libyan forces. Chad 
itself is not important to them; the "real problem" is Libya, which is involved in Chad at the behest of the Soviet Union. 
Since 1979, the Organization of African Unity (OA U) has been actively involved in finding a solution to this seemingly unsolvable 
conflict. This ISSUE BRIEF presents the views of Oumarou Youssouf ou, OA U Ambassador to the United Nations, describes the background 
and causes of the conflict, and examines the Reagan administration's policy toward Chad. □ 
How would you characterize the situation in Chad? What 
are the principal factors that led to the current outbreak of 
fighting? 
YOUSSOUFOU: The situation in Chad today is basically 
the same as it has been for the past twenty years with very 
little variation. Since its independence in 1960, Chad has 
had only about three or four years of peace. It has gone 
from crisis to crisis and from war to war. One fundamental 
problem is that the country, which has a great deal of poten-
tial, has not been able to attract foreign investment or to 
bring about economic development. 
The situation in Chad is clearly a civil war-with foreign 
involvement. Officially, eleven different factions or political 
entities are struggling for some sort of control of different 
parts of the country. No faction in the Chad conflict has 
ever claimed any foreign ideology as the raison d'etre of its 
struggle. Most of the divisions are from the northern part 
of Chad. Most of them are of the Moslem religion, and they 
are from the same areas. Therefore, neither religion nor 
ethnicity is a problem in Chad. 
What role has Libya played in this conflict? What are the 
causes of Libyan intervention? 
YOUSSOUFOU: That question should not be directed to 
me; it should be directed to the Libyan diplomatic delega-
tion . Libya is a neighbor of Chad; and like all of Chad's 
neighbors, it has some interest in the current situation and 
in the OAU attempts to find a peaceful solution. Indeed, 
all of the neighboring countries are involved in finding some 
kind of solution to the conflict. 
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FUL SOLUTION TO 
THIS PROBLEM. 
As to the particular position or the involvement of Libya, 
I cannot comment. I would have been in a better position 
to comment if the OAU had been able to send a fact-finding 
mission. We were supposed to send a mission to Libya; but 
for all kinds of reasons, the mission could not go into the 
area. Consequently, the OAU has had to depend only on 
what we have read in the press . If the OAU had been able 
to send a delegation or a fact-finding mission in the field, 
then we would have been able to assess the situation. All 
we know now is that Libya is one of the parties involved 
in finding some kind of peaceful solution to the Chad 
conflict. 
Is there any validity to the Reagan administration's concep-
tualization of the conflict in East-West terms? 
YOUSSOUFOU: Clearly, African national and regional 
problems cannot be understood in the context of the East-
West conflict. Africa's problems have nothing to do with 
ideology. The issue for our continent is neither capitalism 
nor communism or socialism. Africa's problem today is eco-
nomic development, and that is our major concern. Some 
of us attempt to achieve this goal through a socialist system, 
others through the free economic system. 
There is a conflict in Chad. The OAU is involved in find-
ing a solution to that problem; but we do not look at the 
situation in Chad in terms of left or right, radical or 
moderate, nor East or West. 
In 1979 the OAU met to seek a resolution to the conflict 
in Chad. What conditions did the OAU set and how were 
these conditions observed hy the parties to the dispute? How 
has the OAU position changed over time? 
YOUSSOUFOU: At the OAU conference in Lagos, Nigeria, 
the eleven Chadian factions met with the participation of 
neighboring countries. After about ten days of very difficult 
and tedious negotiations, we were able to create the transi-
tion government of national unity, which had as its President 
Goukouni Woddeye. Part of the cabinet also was formed: 
the Foreign Ministry was given to Acy! Ahmat , who died 
in an airplane accident a few months ago, and the Ministry 
of Defense was given to Hissene Habre, who is one of the 
leaders of that country today. 
Once that transitional government went back to 
Ndjamena, other problems evolved. Eventually, the OAU 
sent a peacekeeping force to Chad. They encountered the 
same problems that peacekeeping forces in the Middle East 
now are facing . That is, what do you do? What is your role? 
Do you fight or do you just separate the factions? In spite 
of the presence of this OAU peacekeeping force, which was 
not to be involved in any war in Chad, there was a conflict 
within the government. The government broke up, and the 
Minister of Defense was able to organize his own army and 
to assume power through a coup. 
The OAU, as an organization, has faced coups in many 
countries throughout the Continent during the last twenty-
three years. Therefore, we have a consistent policy: we do 
not interfere in the internal affairs of any nation in Africa. 
When there is a coup, if the country's people are against 
the government, they will oppose it. It is not up to the OAU 
to accept or reject; we remain neutral. As a result, there has 
been no real change in the OAU position with respect to 
Chad. Whoever is in control of the government is considered 
the head of state of that country. This is the case in Chad. 
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The OAU has sent a delegation-headed by the current 
Chairman, the President of Ethiopia-to France, Libya, and 
other neighboring countries to find a way in which we can 
get the warring parties to sit around a table and negotiate. 
This is the only way out. Sending more arms, more guns, 
and more destructive materiel will not solve the problem. 
Are you hopeful in the short-term? 
YOUSSOUFOU: Yes, we are hopeful in the short-term 
because we feel that if those countries, either African or non-
African, that are involved in the Chadian situation were to 
withdraw or at least stop any active support, then that would 
force the Chadians to negotiate. None of the parties in the 
conflict has the capacity to continue a sustained war. There-
fore, we feel that foreign withdrawal would force the Cha-
dian political factions to accept a peaceful settlement to the 
conflict. 
But the Western powers are not going to disengage until 
Libya disengages. Is there to be a simultaneous reduction 
in force? 
YOUSSOUFOU: I cannot answer that question in any in-
telligible way because the process of negotiations is going 
on right now between different parties in Chad, but I am 
hopeful that a solution can be found. I do not believe that 
SENDING MORE ARMS, MORE GUNS, AND MORE 
DESTRUCTIVE MATERIEL WILL NOT SOLVE THE 
PROBLEM [IN CHAD]. 
any of the foreign countries involved in Chad wants to con-
tinue that war indefinitely. The stakes are such that no coun-
try that is involved today wants to stay in Chad over the 
long-run. All of thei:n would like to find some sort of a 
solution. 
But what kind of a solution would be necessary? Would 
that solution be acceptable to the Chadian people or would 
it only be acceptable to those foreign countries that are in-
volved in the Chad conflict? That to me is the issue. 
Right now we are at an impasse. We have more or less 
a de facto ceasefire situation which I hope will eventually 
result in a declared ceasefire and then in negotiations. 
Would partitioning the country be a viable solution? Would 
an OAU peacekeeping force be either feasible or desirable 
at some point? 
YOUSSOUFOU: We, as a continent, do not believe in the 
partition of Chad or any other country. We have to be con-
sistent with our past decisions and resolutions. In 1964 at 
the first OAU Summit in Cairo, Egypt, we agreed that the 
borders which were created by the colonial governments 
would be accepted and respected. We do not like them. They 
do not take into account our realities, our culture, or our 
well-being, but we have no choice but to keep them. We 
would be opening a Pandora's box if we started changing 
the borders. In the spirit of that resolution, we cannot sup-
port the partition of Chad. Some other solution must be 
found through negotiations among the differing parties. 
Eventually, we might have to send another OAU peace-
keeping force to Chad, but we have not reached that point 
yet in the negotiations. Other African countries are very 
concerned about Chad and will do anything they can to 
help even if it means sending in another peacekeeping 
force. □ 
HISTORICAL PROFILE OF THE I CHADIAN CIVIL WAR 
The policies of French colonial administration are among 
the more significant causes of today's civil war in Chad . 
Over and above the inherently detrimental nature of all co-
lonial administrations, French policies during the sixty years 
of formal rule over Chad contributed heavily towards the 
current problems. Arguably, the most damaging of French 
colonial transgressions in Chad was the widespread denial 
of education, political, and economic roles to large segments 
of the population. Prior to the 1940s, the ethnic majority-
the Sara in the South-was the most vocal victim of this 
policy. However, the most disinherited segment of Chad 's 
population had been those who inhabited the northern two-
thirds of the country. Indeed, the French referred to the 
southern third as "le Tchad utile" (useful Chad), implying 
that the northern sector was useless. Thus, northern resent-
ment of French exclusion forms a potent cause of today's 
strife. The policies of the post-independence government 
proved to be the last straw. 
The regime of Chad's first President, Ngartha Tom-
balbaye, lasted fifteen years from independence in 1960 to 
the April 13, 1975 coup in which he was killed. Tombalbaye, 
a member of the Sara ethnic group, continued to suppress 
and exclude the Muslim north. The north 's negative reac-
tion to Tombalbaye's rule took many forms , leading 
ultimately to the formation of FROLINAT, a national 
liberation movement, and to the start of the armed struggle 
against the government and its French allies. 
Following Tombalbaye's death, leadership of the Nd-
jamena government was assumed by General Felix Malloum, 
another southerner, who was encouraged by France to em-
bark on a policy of reconciliation. Malloum's reconciliation 
effort was largely unsuccessful; and FROLINAT won im-
portant battles. Malloum attempted to negotiate a ceasefire, 
but FROLINAT hardened its position and demanded stiff 
concessions. 
In an attempt to weaken FRO LINA T, Malloum made 
overtures to Hissene Habre, who recently had been expelled 
as leader of the main FROLINAT army. In 1978 in the 
Sudan, Malloum and Habre reached an agreement: Habre 
joined the government and was made its Prime Minister. 
Months later, the Malloum-Habre rapprochement fell apart 
allegedly as a result of Habre's power grab. Fighting ensued 
between Habre's northern troops and the largely southern 
government troops. 
Meanwhile, Goukouni Woddeye was enjoying consider-
able success leading FROLINAT armies against French 
troops in northern Chad. Consequently, he was in control 
of large portions of the country. The French, under political 
pressure at home, scaled down their military objectives in 
Chad, refused to intervene in the Malloum-Habre fighting, 
and looked for a way to withdraw. 
Alarmed by the spreading fighting, Nigeria mounted a 
diplomatic offensive in 1979 that has affected profoundly 
the controlling power in Ndjamena ever since. The Nigerians 
organized four meetings involving the armed factions and 
neighboring countries. The first meeting was attended by 
the leaders of the major armed factions-Malloum, Habre, 
and Woddeye, among others-and resulted in a ceasefire, 
the resignation of both Malloum and Habre, and the in-
troduction of a Nigerian peacekeeping force. 
A second conference was scheduled to determine the com-
position of a transitional national government after the 
resignation of Malloum and Habre. When the conference 
reached no agreement, it ended in disarray. Habre and Wod-
deye accused neighboring countries (primarily Nigeria) of 
heavy-handed manipulation aimed at installing a pliant, pup-
pet government in Ndjamena. 
The major Chadian leaders decided to go their own way 
in filling the Ndjamena power vacuum. The provisional 
council, headed by Woddeye, was dissolved; and a provi-
sional government, headed by Mahamat Shawa, was 
formed. Habre became Defense Minister and Woddeye 
became Interior Minister. Col. Kamougue, who was in 
Ndjamena during the formation of the government, left for 
the south ostensibly to quell secessionist threats . Once he 
got there, however, he assumed leadership of the secessionist 
faction and denounced the Shawa government. 
The Shawa government received a very hostile reaction 
from Chad's neighbors, especially Libya and Nigeria. 
Comparing it to the Muzorewa regime in Rhodesia, they 
threatened to withdraw their support from any further 
reconciliation effort. Nigeria cut off oil supplies to Chad, 
and Libya backed Ahmat Acyl's attempt to take over large 
portions of the north and financed and armed Kamougue' s 
secessionist movement. 
At the 1979 OAU summit, Nigeria and Libya vehement-
ly opposed the seating of the Chad delegation, which was 
consequently barred from participating. The Shawa govern-
ment originally tried fighting back. It battled the Libya-
supported armies in the north with considerable success . 
Eventually, however, the Shawa government gave in and 
attended a second Lagos conference along with represen-
tatives of eleven Chadian factions and neighboring coun-
tries . It agreed on an elaborate set of conditions, including: 
a ceasefire, demilitarization of Ndjamena, a peacekeeping 
force drawn from countries not sharing a border with Chad, 
withdrawal of French troops, disbandment of factional ar-
mies, formation of a new national armed force, formation 
of a government of national unity with Woddeye as Presi-
dent, and elections within eighteen months. 
Upon return to Chad, the factions formed the Govern-
ment of National Unity (GUNT). Key cabinet positions in-
cluded: Woddeye, President; Kamougue , Vice-President; 
Habre, Defense Minister; and Ahmat Acy!, Foreign 
Minister . 
HISTORICAL PROFILE (Continued) 
In early 1980, fighting erupted between Habre's troops 
and those of the other factions in the GUNT government. 
Habre retreated to central and eastern Chad where he won 
several battles against the GUNT forces. The cabinet dis-
missed Habre as Defense Minister, charged that he was re-
ceiving aid from Sudan and Egypt, and threatened to seek 
Libyan help. Throughout the year, Habre's forces won im-
portant battles and continued to press towards Ndjamena. 
The GUNT government, on the other hand, got embroiled 
in disagreements and proved ineffective. Finally, Woddeye 
called in the Libyans . In December 1980 the Libyans 
defeated Habre's forces and strengthened the authority of 
the GUNT government. Habre sought refuge across the 
border in Sudan; and except for a few minor skirmishes, 
the Libyans had effective military control of the country. 
But the presence of Libyan troops elicited sharp protests 
from the West and from conservative African regimes . Other 
African countries and the GUNT pointed out that Chad was 
exercising a sovereign right. They ignored warnings that the 
intervention constituted the first step in the building of a 
Libyan empire through armed conquest and subversion. 
However, when Libya and Chad announced a merger in 
January 1981, the warnings became more ominous. The anti-
Qaddafy forces stepped up their campaign to get rid of 
Libyan trooops in Chad. Libya declared that the troops 
would leave when asked to do so by the legitimate govern-
ment. The Woddeye government, on the other hand, said 
it would retain the troops so long as Habre's insurgency re-
mained a threat. In response, the U.S. and France prodded 
the OAU and Chad and promised support for the OAU 
peacekeeping force and for Chad should the Libyans leave. 
In November Woddeye gave in to the pressure and asked 
the Libyan troops to leave. Warning that the Habre in-
surgency would rear up again, Libya pulled out its entire 
force in a matter of days. The OAU dispatched a 3,500-man 
peacekeeping force drawn from Zaire, Nigeria, and Senegal. 
The Habre forces moved in from Sudan and gained control 
over large sections of eastern and northern Chad . Woddeye 
charged that the Habre forces were being armed by Egypt 
and Sudan and threatened to seek external help. In February 
the OAU invited Woddeye to a Nairobi meeting of its ad 
hoc committee on Chad to discuss maintenance of the 
peacekeeping force. Faced with Habre's strength and the 
lack of funding for the peacekeeping force, the committee 
members decided to cut their losses. They asked Woddeye 
to call a ceasefire within weeks, negotiate with Habre, and 
hold elections. Woddeye, insisting that the OAU force 
should fight the insurgency as the Libyans had, branded the 
OAU decision a betrayal and left the meeting. In Chad the 
peacekeeping force refused to fight Habre, who subsequently 
defeated the GUNT forces in several battles and captured 
Ndjamena in June 1982. The government broke into its fac-
tions and headed south. Woddeye vowed" ... to march on 
Ndjamena ... " and sought asylum in Algeria. 
Habre established a provisional government and sought 
negotiations with other factions. He succeeded in winning 
over a section of the Kamougue forces who had split over 
the question of joining the Habre government. Kamougue 
himself eventually joined Woddeye as did the forces original-
ly headed by the GUNT Foreign Minister, the late Ahmat 
Acy!. Woddeye has established his own provisional govern-
ment as well as an "Army for National Liberation." 
At the 1982 abortive OAU summit in Tripoli, Habre and 
Woddeye both sent delegations. The Habre delegation was 
seen as having more support, a situation that was confirmed 
at the 1983 OAU summit in Addis Ababa. Woddeye has 
since attempted to fulfill his threat ''. . _ . to march on 
Ndjamena ... " using strong Libyan backing. Pro-Habre 
governments have charged that Woddeye's forces are large-
ly, if not wholly, Libyan. However, in June both the UN 
and the French Foreign Minister stated that no evidence of 
regular Libyan troops has been found. The Woddeye forces 
attacked from the north and by July controlled Faya-
Largeau and Abeche. 
The 1983 fighting brought forth an enormous amount of 
international outcry, largely led by the U.S., and generated 
considerable overt support for Habre. This massive support 
of Ndjamena has stopped the Woddeye forces (who are 
receiving large quantities of Libyan arms) and resulted in 
the current stalemate. Since late August, Chad has been 
divided into two north and south sections, controlled by two 
heavily-armed and hostile armies. 
Although most Western observers have tended to see the 
Chadian problem as resulting from"the unbridgeable 
ethnic/ religious gap" between the Muslim north and the 
non-Muslim south, ethnic diversity in and of itself is not 
a sufficient cause for civil war in Chad or any other coun-
try. Chad, with at least 192 ethnic groups, is typical of other 
African nations in being ethnically diverse. After all, Tan-
zania, ranked on the basis of ethnicity as the most 
heterogeneous nation in the world, has not had a notable 
civil disturbance in its sovereign history while the two 
Koreas, ranked together as the most homogeneous, are to-
day divided into two armed and hostile camps. In Chad, 
however, ethnic diversity has provided a conducive climate 
in which other causal factors have resulted in armed insur-
rection and civil war. 
Personal animosity between Chad's leaders is accepted to-
day as one of the major reasons why the conflict has not 
been solved. As Rene LeMarchand has said, "personalities 
are all important ... " in the Chadian civil war. Indeed, 
some observers see this factor, especially between leaders 
of the same northern origins, as having eclipsed, if only for 
now, the north's resentment of southern domination of 
political power. It is widely believed that animosity between 
Habre and Kamougue and between Habre and Woddeye has 
contributed significantly to the breakup of previous at-
tempted solutions. Indeed, despite his acknowledged 
strengths, Habre, reportedly, is seen by his colleagues and 
observers as being a ruthlessly ambitious, intransigent leader 
who has managed to make more important enemies than 
all other Chadian leaders. Many observers, therefore, believe 
that the animosity and distrust between Habre and Wod-
deye is likely to be one of the major obstacles to a new 
reconciliation. 
Finally, that external patrons have prolonged Chad's civil 
war should be rather obvious. An underdeveloped country 
that is one of the poorest in the world with no military pro-
duction capacity is simply not capable of fighting a modern 
civil war for eighteen years if outside sources had not been 
pouring in arms, money, training, and troops. Until out-
side intervention of all kinds is stopped, a political solution 
to Chad's seemingly endless civil war is not likely to be 
found. □ 
REAGAN WATCH: FIGHTING THE COLD WAR IN CHAD 
"We have to bear in mind that there is an ongoing hot war, 
and the two contending parties fare] the government of Chad 
and the government of Libya . . .. It is basically a Libyan-
Chadian conflict." 
Chester Crocker 
Publicly, the Reagan administration asserts that its policy 
toward Chad is to remain neutral in the civil war, express 
no preference among the various factional leaders, and en-
courage work towards political reconciliation. It also op-
poses external involvement and aggression in Chad. The 
State Department offers evidence in support of this state-
ment: the U.S. provided $12 million to support the OAU's 
peacekeeping force and $4 million in emergency (food) 
assistance to the Chad government in 1982. The Department 
justifies U.S. recognition of the Hissene Habre government 
on the grounds that the Goukouni Woddeye government was 
too weak and intransigent and that the overwhelming ma-
jority of OAU members also recognize Habre. 
An examination of what evidence is available, however, 
reveals that the policy that actually has been prosecuted-
covertly and overtly-in Chad, may not be as fair-minded 
or balanced as the public statements would imply. 
Upon assumption of office and throughout 1981, the 
Reagan administration expressed serious concern about the 
"Libyan occupation of Chad" and called for Libyan 
withdrawal. It assured both the OAU and Chad President 
Woddeye that it would support the GUNT government and 
contribute financially towards the upkeep of the OAU 
peacekeeping force. 
And yet during this same period, the administration 
allegedly was engaged in activities at variance with its public 
declarations . These activities amounted to one thing: strong 
covert support of Habre. Egypt and Sudan, close allies of 
the U.S. in the region, continued to provide Habre with 
arms, sanctuary, and, it has been alleged, troops . Most 
significantly, the CIA is said to have given Habre $10 million 
around the time he met U.S. Ambassador-at-Large, General 
Vernon Walters in Sudan. 
After the Libyans withdrew in 1982, the U.S. provided 
support for the OAU peacekeeping force: $12 million to pro-
vide airlift and non-lethal equipment-less than eight per-
cent of what the OAU had estimated it needed. 
As soon as Habre assumed power in June 1982, the U.S. 
lost no time in recognizing him. As the State Department 
says, "We enjoy cordial relations with the new Habre pro-
visional government." Shortly thereafter, large amounts of 
military and lesser amounts of economic aid were extended 
to Chad. 
Although the June-August 1983 fighting in Chad was 
simply an attempt by Woddeye-with Libyan support-to 
dislodge Habre, the Reagan administration sees the fighting 
as an invasion of Chad by Libya on behalf of the Russians. 
This view has facilitated providing Habre with strong 
military and diplomatic support. First, Reagari sent two 
AW ACS planes, a complement of fighter and recon-
naissance escort planes, Redeye anti-aircraft missiles, and 
a number of military personnel. American military presence 
may have reached five hundred men. The President quickly 
invoked the War Powers Act and informed Congress . 
Next, the administration pressured certain of its allies and 
friends to support Habre. With the President declaring that 
Chad is within the French "sphere of influence," the ad-
ministration persuaded France-after initial public 
protestations-to send arms. By the end of August, France 
had sent fighter planes, anti-tank helicopters, large amounts 
of other equipment, and 2,000 troops, headed by a general, 
to Chad. Also, two Francophone African presidents, Diouf 
of Senegal and Mobutu of Zaire, visited Washington and 
called for help for Habre. Days after leaving Washington, 
Mobutu had dispatched planes and troops and had paid an 
official visit to Chad-a move Reagan praised as 
"courageous." Since August, the administration has pro-
vided an additional $25 million in arms directly to Chad. 
By late September, according to the State Department, $13 
million had been utilized. 
U.S. critics of the Reagan administration's actions may 
be grouped around three positions. One group regards Chad 
as much too insignificant to warrant the attention and aid 
it recently has received. The second group of critics argues 
that the whole problem would have been quickly solved if 
strong military action had been taken against the Libyans. 
A final group thinks that the U.S. role should be much more 
active involvement in finding a political settlement and that 
the strong military support will only exacerbate the situation. 
But Reagan's policy toward Chad emanates from two 
ideological viewpoints : first, the conflict is a manifestation 
of U.S.-Soviet, East-West rivalry and second, African na-
tions fall within "spheres of influence" belonging to other 
nations. Influential critics in both the U.S. and Africa 
publicly object to both of these attitudes. They point out 
that the absurdity of the "spheres" argument in particular: 
if nations are entitled to such "spheres" thanks to their 
economic and military strength, then why not Libya, which 
is currently one of the richest and strongest African states? 
That "spheres of influence" remains a de facto operating 
principle in international relations cannot be denied, 
however. 
Reagan's policy appears to be suffused with an ulterior 
motive: use Chad to "clip Qaddafy's wings and bloody his 
nose." Others argue that Reagan favors Habre because he 
agreed to construction of U.S. bases in Chad. Another "real 
aim," some suggest, is to protect Israel by preventing 
Qaddafy from sending Chadian uranium to Pakistan for the 
manufacture of an Islamic bomb. 
But with the large quantities of arms that have been in-
troduced into Chad lately, foreign governments, like the 
U.S., merely have prolonged and exacerbated Chad's prob-
lems. The eighteen year old Chadian civil war has shown 
that-with one exception-all the ingredients needed for an 
unwinnable war have been present: a vast territory, impossi-
ble to control through armed might; ethnic and religious 
diversity; extreme poverty; years of economic mismanage-
ment; political repression and injustice; ambitious but weak 
local leaders; and foreign patronage. What had prevented 
the conflict from being even more destructive was the 
absence of large quantities of modern weapons from the ma-
jor powers. The 1983 fighting has enabled the U.S., Libya, 
France, and Zaire to provide that missing link. Ironically, 
the immediate effect has been the current stalemate. 
However , if advantage is not taken of this de facto ceasefire, 
if a just political solution is not found, Chad is more than 
likely to become Africa's Lebanon. D 
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first legitimate Afro-American plate produced by an Afro-American company 
and features the art work of famous artist Ellis Wilson. 
masterful work of art, but it is the firstissue in the 
first series in the history of plate collecting to pay 
tribute to the Black Mother. As the first issue in 
the first series by an Afro-American artist, this 
fine plate is clearly destined to be of interest to 
not only plate collectors but to others because of 
its aesthetic and historic value as well as 
investment potential. 
"MAMA" will be limited to a first edition of 
20,000 plates for worldwide distribution. 
With more than six million plate collectors 
worldwide who will instantly recognize the value 
and significance of this plate, we urge you to return 
the attached form as soon as pos.,ible in order to 
ensure receiving one of these very historic plates. 
The backstamp of each plate will be 
individually numbered and a correspondingly 
numbered certificate of authenticity will 
accompany each plate. Each plate will be enclosed 
in a beautiful satin-lined keepsake case. 
PURCHASE PRICE INCLUDES A $29 TAX-DEDUCTIBLE 
CONTRIBUTION TO TRANSAFRICA FORUM 
Please enter my reservatio n for this historic fi rst limited edition produced by H eritage Heirlooms, Inc. 
The plate features the art work of artist Ellis Wilson. The first issue limited edition will sell for $149.50. 
Postage and shipping charges included. 
Please send me plate(s). 
D With this order, ! enclose my check or money order for $149.50. 
D By credit card. C harge $149.50 to my credit card (check one). 
__ MasterCard 
__ Visa 
__ American Express 
__ Choice 
My full account number is _______________ Exp. Date _______ _ 
Signature ____________________ Phone('----------
To expedite charge orders, call 800-356-2000 (Washington area call 202-371-1770.) 
NAME 
STREET APT.# 
CITY ____________ STATE ______ ZIP _____ _ 
Mail to: Heritage Heirlooms, Inc., P.O. Box 28465, Washington, D.C. 20005 
All applications are subject to acceptance. Please allow six to eight weeks for delivery. 
Non-Profit 
Organization 
U.S . Postage 
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